교통안전특정해역은 해사안전법에 따라 설정되어 대형 해양사고를 막고 수 역 안전 및 항행 안전을 확보하는 목적을 지니고 있다. 하지만, 설정 범위에 있 어 국제법과 행정상의 원칙에 저촉되는 사안이 있다. 먼저, 바다의 헌법이라 불리는 해양법에 관한 국제연합협약(유엔해양법협약) 에 따른 접속수역에 교통안전특정해역이 설정되어 있으며 접속수역이 갖는 관 할권을 기준으로 본다면 교통안전특정해역과 관련된 모든 법령이 저촉되는 것은 아니지만, 대부분 법령이 저촉된다는 점을 알 수 있다. 특히 접속수역에서 보장되는 항행의 자유에 대한 침해가 주요한 문제라고 볼 수 있다. 이에 대한 해결방안으로 설정 수역 범위를 영해 내로 축소하거나 수역 안전 확보라는 공 익적 목적을 근거로 주변국의 인정을 받는 방법을 제시하였다. 또한, 행정기본법에 따른 비례의 원칙에 따라 울산구역과 포항구역을 살펴보 면 입법목적에 부합하지 않고 필요 이상으로 범위를 설정하여 공익 달성 없이 사익이 침해받는 구역이 있다. 이에 대한 해결방안으로 울산구역의 경우 거대 선 및 위험화물 운반선의 통항이 없는 저수심 구역의 제외를 제시하고, 포항구 역의 경우 실제 통항량이 존재하는 영일만 내로 범위를 한정하거나 혹은 유조 선통항금지구역 내로 범위를 한정하는 것을 제시하였다.

The periodic safety review (PSR), for all operating nuclear power plants in Korea, has been conducted in accordance with SSG-25, a guideline suggested by the IAEA, The PSR is performed through the review of the regulatory body after the operator’s self-evaluation. In order to guarantee a high level of safety in consideration of the changed environment, such as operating experience (OE) and technology development, it should be comprehensively and integratedly performed, and it is also carried out every 10 years after the operation permit. However, in case that all or part of the reactor facilities have been permanently shut down, such as Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1, Around a half of reactor facilities are not in operation. The periodic safety evaluation may not be conducted for unused parts if there is no safety hazard and if there are some difficulties for applying periodic safety evaluation. In considering that the biggest purpose of PSR safety (by PSR definition of KINS guideline) is to improve and accumulated factors such as aging deterioration, facility change, operation experience, and technological development for operating nuclear power plants. It refers to a comprehensive safety evaluation that is periodically performed during the period of operation of a nuclear power plant. It is necessary to review whether PSR should be performed for a nuclear power plant that is permanently shut down after nuclear power plant operation is terminated. Also, in IAEA SSR 2/2 Rev1, it is defined that PSR is performed during the nuclear power plant operation period. “Requirement 12: Periodic safety review, Systematic safety assessments of the plant, in accordance with the regulatory requirements, shall be performed by the operating organization throughout the plant’s operating lifetime, with due account taken of operating experience and significant new safety related information from all relevant sources”. Recently, Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1 were decided to permanently shut down in June 2017 and December 2019, and are currently being prepared for decommissioning. According to the Wolsong decommissioning plan, decontamination and demolition will be completed by 2032. The PSR for permanent shutdown of Kori Unit 1 was submitted to the regulatory body in December 2018 and is under approval review. In the case of the permanent shutdown PSR of Wolsong Unit 1, the project will be launched in May 2023 and the PSR will be submitted to the regulatory body in May 2024. In the case of Wolsong Unit 1, it is necessary to operate the various systems, including the systems related to the spent fuel storage tank, even during the period of permanent shutdown. Such as the heavy water related systems used in common with Wolsong Unit 2, are essential operating systems. Based on Basic Subject Index (BSI), 112 out of 218 systems require operation, indicating that about 50% of systems require operation even after permanent shutdown. Decommissioning of systems and equipment will begin after the transfer to modular air-cooled canister storage (MACSTOR) by the end of 2025, and then in-depth discussions will be needed whether PSR evaluation is meaningful.

Around the world, Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) have been operated since the 1950s and are used as a major power source. In Korea, Kori unit 1 stared commercial operation for the first time in 1978, and as of 2023, 25 units of NPPs are in operation. NPPs produce electricity for about 40 to 60 years after receiving an operating license, and after securing safety through a safety evaluation, the operating period is extended. NPPs that operate for a long time are systematically evaluated for safety at regular intervals through Periodic Safety Review (PSR) recommended by the IAEA. In Korea, PSR has been introduced and performed since 2000. This study reviewed the process of the PSR by comparing with the international PSR procedure. The PSR process is established through the IAEA SSG-25 document and proceeds in the order of establishment of basis document - individual factor evaluation - global assessment - integrated improvement plan. In Korea, PSR is carried out in a similar process, but there are some differences from the IAEA’s procedure. The safety factor review is conducted under the agreement of basis document between the licensee and the regulatory body, but the prior agreement procedure with the regulatory body is not reflected in Korea. As a result, if the licensee and the regulatory body have different opinions on the current licensing basis and the modern safety standards after the evaluation is performed, a difference may occur in the review results and safety enhancement items, which may lead to inefficient PSR progress. PSR is conducted for the continuous safe operation and management of NPPs, and it is important to refer to overseas standards and cases. Although procedures, guidelines, and regulatory requirements are in place in Korea, continuous review and improvement are required. It is necessary to improve procedures such as basis document and global assessment in order to more efficiently carry out PSR evaluation by regulatory agency and licensee’s safety enhancement actions of domestic NPPs

An objective of a safety assessment for geological disposal is to evaluate the radiological impact by radionuclides release from radioactive wastes. Computational estimation of all radionuclides transport in the disposal system, however, is not neccessary because some radionuclides has negligible effect on radiological doses. For this reason, prioritization of radionuclides list is preceded before the safety assessment. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institue (KAERI) has assessed the long-term safety of a disposal system for spent nculear fuels. Currently, thirty eight radionuclides and twenty three elements are considered in the safety assessment activity of the KAERI. Nevertheless, a screening process for radionulides selection has not been articulated yet. In this study, we reviewed radionuclides selection process in forign countries to re-establish screening criteria for the KAERI’s radionuclides list. Screeing models of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB), the Deparment of Eenrgy (US DOE), and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Istitute (JNC) were compared. We found that each country developed different screening model depending on scenarios of radionuclides release. Nonetheless, there were common properties that determines the importance of radionuclides. These properties for radionuclides include halflife, radiotoxicity (or specific activity), and mobility in underground medium. Based on the review results, we proposed radionuclides selection process to prioritize the importance of radionucldies in the KAERI safety assessment.

The timescale for the post-closure safety assessment of a deep geological repository ranges from ten thousand to a million year. In such a long period of time, the biosphere inevitably undergoes changes. Therefore, the long-term evolution of a biosphere is recognized as an important issue in the post-closure safety assessment of a deep geological repository for spent fuels. In this study, we reviewed the approaches to address the long-term evolution of a biosphere. The major drivers of longterm evolution of a biosphere are the climate change and the resulting landscape development. They can affect the hydrogeological and hydrogeochemical characteristics of a biosphere, and then the radionuclide migration through the biosphere followed by the exposure doses for the critical groups. In addition, human activities and the social developments can affect the climate change resulting in the long-term evolution of a biosphere. To make a biosphere assessment, the long-term evolution scenarios for the biosphere should be formulated considering these climate change, landscape development, and human activities. In addition, features, events, and processes (FEPs) that affect the long-term evolution of a biosphere should be used. According to the Safety Case reports of Finland, the major long-term evolution scenario drivers of a biosphere are local sea-level change due to climate change and land use related to crop type, irrigation procedures, livestock, forest management, construction of a well, and demographics. The climate change causing the local sea-level change can be simulated using various earth system models such as CLIMBER-2, MPI/UW, and UVic and an icesheet model such as SICOPOLIS. The review results of this study and FEPs related to the climate change, the landscape development, and human activities will be used to formulate long-term evolution scenarios for the safety assessment of a deep geological repository for spent fuels.

The purpose of this study is to reveal through discourse analysis the processes and patterns in which discrimination and hate in Korean society is produced. The social aspect of discrimination and hatred is practiced and reproduced through discourse. Discourses related to dogs were selected for this inquiry, because discrimination and hatred against dogs, especially large dogs today, are confirmed through various discourse(language sources) of the media. For this critical discourse study, van Dijk's approach, emphasizing the cognitive component when exploring the relationship between discourse and society, was applied. As a result of the analysis, it was identified that the polarized distinction between ‘we’ group and ‘they’ groups according to categorization, discrimination based on prejudice and stereotypes, and hatred due to contemptuous attitudes were sequentially developed. And it was found that the division and discrimination were represented and reproduced through the discourse at the macro-level of society, and the hate was represented through the discourse at the micro-level.