The operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants (NPPs) creates waste in the process of handling radioactively contaminated material, which must be disposed of in a repository or can be recovered of in the same way as conventional waste in the course of handling radioactively contaminated materials. For buildings or sites of NPPs it also has to be decided under what conditions they can continue to be used for other, conventional purposes or demolished. This decision is referred to as “release from supervision under nuclear and radiation protection law” or “clearance” in short. The clearance levels applicable in Germany according to the Radiation Protection Ordinance have been defined such that a radiation dose (hereinafter referred to as “dose”) of 10 μSv per year is not exceeded. The vast majority of the materials resulting from the dismantling of a nuclear power plant (e.g. most of the massive concrete structures) are neither contaminated nor activated. Thus, there is no need to treat these materials as radioactive waste. Emplacement of uncontaminated masses which in Germany is essentially several million tonnes of building rubble in a repository would require additional construction of such facilities, which, in view of the negligible hazard potential, from the point of view of the Nuclear Waste Management Commission (ESK) is clearly to be rejected both economically and, in particular, ecologically. Alternative ways are increasingly discussed in public, such as the abandonment of buildings after gutting, i.e. refraining from demolition of the controlled area buildings of NPPs. Also, another proposal discussed in public, the landfilling or the long-term storage of cleared material at the site, does not offer any safety-related advantages either in the view of the ESK. If, after completion of all dismantling work, the building has been decontaminated such that the clearance levels for buildings are complied with further use of the building rubble resulting from demolition is harmless from a radiological point of view. For these reasons, Germany has deliberately decided to use clearance as an essential measure in the dismantling of NPPs. If it is intended to conventionally reuse or depose of virtually contaminant-free material from controlled areas, it must first undergo a clearance procedure. The prerequisites that must be fulfilled for clearance are regulated in the Radiation Protection Ordinance, which includes two basic clearance pathways: unrestricted and specific clearance. In the following, the basic process of clearance is briefly presented and illustrated for a better understanding. It comprises five steps. Step 1-Radiological characterization by sampling, Step 2-Dismantling of plant components in the controlled area, Step 3- Decontamination, Step 4-Decission measurements, Step 5-Clearacnce and further management. The entire clearance process is governed by a clearance notice and is carried out under the supervision of the competent authority under nuclear and radiation protection law or the independent authorized expert commissioned by it. The clearance pathways contained in the Radiation Protection Ordinance have proven themselves in practice. They permit safe and proper management of material from dismantling and release of the site from supervision under nuclear and radiation protection law. These German regulatory procedures should be taken into account and deregulation and removal should be used as appropriate and necessary tools in the process of decommissioning NPPs in order to return non-hazardous materials to the material cycle or for conventional disposal.

Although it is highly dependent on the production of coastal and offshore fishing, the Fishing Vessels Safety Fisheries Act was enacted in 2019 due to the continuous increase in marine accidents of coastal and offshore fishing vessels. However, the law is too focused on fishing and navigation in certain waters and does not contain accident-preventive content. Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries proposes a plan to revise the Fishing Boat Safety Fishing Act through legal comparison with Japan's Seafarers' Labor Sanitation Rules. It also proposes an amendment that includes the content of the Seafarers Act on post-accident action obligations. Under the Fishing Vessels Safety Fishing Act, the safety fishing education is implemented for specific people and adopts a method of delivery education after completing the education. The reason for this is that the educational requirements are not sufficient compared to the number of education personnel. Moreover, four hours of education are conducted once a year, which is not suitable for insufficient educational conditions. For efficient safety fishing education, improvement measures are proposed compared to education in the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a framework for promoting compliance with laws and regulations and minimizing violations. It aims to prevent law breaches, by raising awareness of the compliance within the organization, which leads to enhance the credibility of the organization, and to prepare for audits. From the perspective of nuclear export control, ICP can be used to verify the company’s credibility by following NSG Guidelines and is expected to contribute to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international community. However, ICP system is not globally established, and the NSG does not provide official guidelines for ICP. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the “Good Practices for Internal Compliance Programs for Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Exports” provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to find ways to apply and activate ICPs for domestic exporters. The form of ICP could vary depending on company’s size and internal environments, but it should be organized as follows. First, an internal department should be established so as to implement the ICP, and an executive who has export control knowledge should be assigned as the Chief Export Control Officer (CECO). The CECO, establish and revise ICP operating procedures and manual, organize contact point to communicate internally and externally. Second, measures should be established minimize risks in the export process, including business development transaction screening, supply chain, research and development, human resource, and intangible technology transfer risks. Third, internal control system should be established for export control compliance. The CECO should conduct regular assessments to ensure compliance and strengthen the organization’s internal export compliance processes. Fourth, an export-related training program should be periodically conducted for employees. In addition, as soon as the CECO becomes aware of, CECO should review the matter, take corrective action, and report to the relevant national authorities, when a violation of domestic export control laws or suspicious circumstances are captured. Nuclear export control plays an important role in ensuring nuclear nonproliferation. Republic of Korea has been implementing the ICP system for Dual-Use Items under the Foreign Trade Act, but not for Trigger List Items. Therefore, introduction of ICP for Trigger List Items is expected significantly contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. The subjects of ICP will be initially targeted to major nuclear enterprises, then gradually expanded to all nuclear enterprises. Further researches are needed to introduce on ICP for Trigger List Items.

A person who performs or plans to conduct a physical protection inspection as stipulated by the law, the act on physical protection and radiological emergency, should obtain an inspector’s ID card certified and authorized by Nuclear Safety and Security Commission Order No.137 (referred to as Order 137). In addition, according to Order 137, KINAC has been operating some training courses for those with the inspector’s ID card or intending to acquire it. Also, strenuous efforts have been put to incrementally elevate their inspection related expertise. Since Republic of Korea has to import uranium enriched less than 20% in order to manufacture fuels of nuclear reactors in domestic and abroad, the physical protection for categorization III nuclear material in transit is significantly important along with an increase in transport. The expertise of inspectors should be constantly needed to strengthen as the increase in transport leads to an increase in inspection of nuclear material in transit. We have suggested a special way to improve the inspector’s capacities through Virtual Reality technology (VR). A 3-Dimensional virtual space was designed and developed using a 3-axis simulator and VR equipment for practical training. HP’s Reverb G2 product, which was developed in collaboration with VALVE Corporation and MicroSoft, was used as VR equipment, and the 3-axis motion simulator was developed by M-line STUDIO corp. in Korea for the purpose of realizing virtual reality. The training scenarios of transport inspection consist of three parts: preparation at the shipping point, transport in route including stops and handover at the receiving point. At the departure point, scenario of the transport preparation is composed with the contents of checking the transport-related documents which should be carried by shipper and/or carrier during transport and confirming who the shipper and/or carrier is. Second, scenario is designed for inspector to experience how carrier and/or shipper protect the nuclear material during transport or stops for rests or contingency and how they communicate with each other during transport. Lastly, scenario is developed focusing on key check items during handover of responsibilities to the facility operator at the destination. Those training scenarios can be adopted to strengthen the capabilities of those with inspector’s ID card of physical protection in accordance with Order 137 and to help new inspectors acquire inspectionrelated expertise. In addition, they can be used for domestic education to promote understanding of nuclear security, or may be used for education for people overseas for the purpose of export of nuclear facilities.

Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and KINAC review a Cyber Security Plan (CSP) by「ACT ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY」. The CSP contains cyber security implementation plans for the licensee’s nuclear power plant, and it shall meet the requirements of KINAC/RS-015, a regulatory standard. The KINAC/RS-015 provides more detailed information on the legal requirements, so if licensees implement cyber security under the approved CSP, they can meet the law. To protect nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks, licensees should identify their essential digital assets, so-called “Critical Digital Assets” (CDAs). Then, they apply cyber security controls (countermeasures for cyber-attacks) on CDAs consisting of technical, operational, and management security controls. However, it is hard to apply cyber security controls on CDAs because of the large amounts of CDAs and security controls in contrast to the shortage of human resources. So, licensees in the USA developed a methodology to solve this problem and documented it by NEI 13-10, and US NRC endorsed this document. The main idea of this methodology is, by classifying CDAs according to their importance, applying small amounts of security controls on less important CDAs, so-called non-direct CDAs. In the case of non-direct CDAs, only basic cyber security controls are applied, that is, baseline cyber security controls. The baseline cyber security controls are a minimum set of cyber security controls; they consist of control a) from control g) a total of 7 controls. Although non-direct CDAs are less critical than other CDAs (direct CDAs), they are still essential to protect them from cyber-attacks. This paper aims to suggest a cyber security enhancement method for non-direct CDAs by analyzing the baseline cyber security controls. In this paper, baseline cyber security controls were analyzed respectively and relatively and then concluded how to apply small amounts of cyber security controls on non-direct CDAs rather than direct CDAs without scarifying cyber security.

An administrative agreement (AA) was signed between NSSC and UAE FANR in January 2023 under Article 5 of the ROK-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The AA aims to enhance regulatory efficiency in safeguards and export control. This study reviewed the export control measures for the items subject to the agreement (ISA) and implementation procedures under ROK-UAE AA by comparing them with other countries cases. First of all, the ROK-UAE AA distinguishes between ISA and the inventory management target items. Technology is divided into two categories, one requiring consent for retransfer and the other, considering the characteristics of technology that is free to be copied and deleted, and thus less useful for inventory management. Only the former is included in the annual report, which differs from the ROK-Canada or ROK-Japan NCA, which includes all technologies subject to the agreements in the annual report. When ROK notifies export information, it is mandatory to specify whether the technology requires consent for retransfer. Furthermore, some technologies should be controlled as strategic information, even if excluded from the annual report, so efforts to prevent confusion are required. Secondly, the ROK-UAE AA covers all items in INFCIRC/254/rev.9/part1, unlike the ROK-U.S. and ROK-Canada NCA, which listed equipment subject to them. This is significant because it clarifies the criteria for regulation by increasing the consistency between the trigger list items in the domestic law and the ISA. However, the expanded ISA scope could result in some changes in export control procedures. For example, when importing nuclear material (NM) from the US, only uranium was controlled as ISA, and the packages were not considered. In contrast, when exporting fuel assemblies (FA) for UAE, both uranium and zirconium cladding should be treated as ISA. To this end, NEPS was improved to implement the features of the ROK-UAE AA. Consideration of the criteria and methods for imposing obligations under the agreement is essential because this is the first case of Korea concluded AA under exporting NPP and as a supplier of FA. Generally, the obligations for NM are imposed by the country of origin, conversion, and enrichment countries. Canada and EU recognize the fuel fabrication process as a substantial transformation and impose customs origin where the process takes place. Hence, NM fabricated from Canadian equipment is also subject to the same obligations as NM of Canadian origin. From this perspective, it would be appropriate to ensure ROK acts as a supplier and controls when exporting domestically manufactured FA. Moreover, a proper national obligation code system will be required to specify Korea’s control rights.

According to the “Law on protection and response measures for nuclear facilities and radiation”, Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) licensees should conduct periodic exercises based on hypothetical cyberattack scenarios, and there is a need to select significant and probable ones in a systematic manner. Since cyber-attacks are carried out intentionally, it is difficult to statistically specify the sequences, and it is not easy to systematically establish exercise scenarios because existing engineering safety facilities can be forcibly disabled. To deal with the above situation, this paper suggests a procedure using the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) model to develop a cybersecurity exercise scenario. The process for creating cyber security exercise scenarios consists of (i) selecting cyber-attack-causing initiating events, (ii) identifying digital systems, (iii) assigning cyber-attack vectors to a digital system, (iv) determining and adding type for operator’s response, (v) modifying a baseline PSA model, and (vi) extracting top-ranked minimal cut sets, and (vii) selecting a representative scenario. This procedure is described in detail through a case study, an expected cyber-attack scenario General Transient-Anticipated Transient Without Scram (GTRN-ATWS). It refers to an accident scenario for ATWS induced by GTRN. Since ATWS is targeted for cyber training in some NPPs, and GTRN is one of the most common accidents occurring in NPPs, GTRN-ATWS was chosen as an example. As for the cyber-attack vector, portable media and mobile devices were selected as examples based on expert judgment. In this paper, only brief examples of GTRN-ATWS events have been presented, but future studies will be conducted on an analysis of all initiating events in which cyber-attacks can occur.

On January 4, 2020, the official Twitter account of the former US President Trump threatens to target Iran’s cultural heritage sites conditioned on any Iranian retaliation on US military forces then stationed in the Middle East. The immediate context was that the US-led drone strike had killed Iran’s Major General Qasem Soleimani in Iraq (Baghdad) only two days prior. This study critically analyzes whether “Tweets” uploaded to President Trump’s Twitter account could reasonably be construed as a type of harm against international law instruments and framework on the safeguarding of cultural heritage. This paper provides a brief contextual overview of President Trump’s Tweets; traces the historical destruction of cultural property during conflicts and discusses the preservation of heritage; delineates international laws and assesses whether President Trump and the US might be legally bound to refrain from threats to destroy cultural property; and examines the increasing role of social media in the evolution of the idea of diplomacy.

Since the beginning of the seventh century, Islamic law has played an essential role in protecting the personal, economic, judicial, and political rights of civilians during armed conflict. Fourteen centuries before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted in 1948, it had already initiated a human revolution consisting of a set of human principles. In addition, Islamic law has made a significant contribution to international humanitarian law (IHL). This paper focuses on two specific legal constructs in warfare: the definition of the combatant and the principle of distinction. This article comparatively examines how these two laws deal with different aspects of war that fall under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. A comparative analysis of the various elements and aspects of just war theory in Islamic and contemporary international law provides a much deeper understanding of its limitations. We can safely conclude that there is a unique relationship between the Islamic law of war and IHL.

This paper analyzes the need to strengthen the law applicable to Flag of Convenience (FoC) States and vessels with the goal of sustaining fish stocks and combatting overfishing on the high seas. FoC States and vessels can escape law enforcement conducted by the other flag states. Due to the lack of political will of FoC States to enforce the law and obligations imposed on FoC vessels to conduct conservation on the high seas, FoC vessels instead contribute significantly to the deterioration of fish stocks on the high seas. FoC vessels overexploit these resources and engage in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which harms the fish stocks on the high seas. The results of the study indicate that there are some legal lacunas in international legal obligations for FoC States and vessels to conserve the fish stocks on the high seas. Existing international legal instruments are ineffective in combating over-exploitation of fish stocks on the high seas by FoC vessels. Hence, strengthen the laws applicable to the FoC States and FoC vessels is urgently needed.

This Commentary provides a detailed analysis of the US-DPRK Peace Treaty, a proposed bilateral peace treaty between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (i.e., North Korea). The US-DPRK Peace Treaty was conceived as the first in a series of legal instruments to be executed in furtherance of the establishment of “peace as a system” on the Korean Peninsula. In this monograph, the authors envision that such a peace treaty would serve as a basis for peaceful co-existence between the two countries and, ultimately, a peaceful, non-volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Commentary offers an in-depth explanation of each provision of the US-DPRK Peace Treaty, including the meaning, background, rationale and legal implications of individual provisions of the Peace Treaty. Additionally, it provides insight into relevant international law issues and the history of negotiations and engagement among interested parties in the context of the inter-Korean conflict.

There is no doubt that the BRICS countries established in 2000-01, have already made their mark on the international stage. Increasing relations among BRICS countries with less developed nations through south-south cooperation, especially, China, India, and Russia and with least developed countries are of significant importance. BRICS has been the forerunner of cooperation, collaboration and reformation of the present international governance structure and to move towards multilateralism. Over the years, BRICS has become a platform of, and for the developing countries. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has created divisions in the world, impacting diplomatic relations that BRICS needs to address. The fact that Russia is the member of BRICS makes things complicated and new challenges has emerged for the bloc to take necessary actions and policy considerations. The article examines the challenges and opportunities for BRICS (as a bloc) amid Russia-Ukraine conflict in a post pandemic world.

Non-discrimination is a fundamental principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which promotes global trade with the goal of eradicating hunger, reducing poverty, and ensuring global prosperity. According to the WTO rules, members are required to give other members most-favoured-nation and national treatment. Due to the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the United States, European Union, and several other member countries suspended most-favoured-nation treatment for Russian goods in mid-March 2022. This study examines the principle of non-discrimination under the WTO provisions, identifies relevant exceptions, analyses the Russia-Traffic in Transit case, and evaluates the appropriateness of the above actions by the US and others. Finally, this paper concludes that the US and its allies failed to present concrete evidence demonstrating a direct and causal relationship between the military situation in Ukraine and their own essential interests under Article XXI of GATT 1994.

Southeast Asia is home to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, one of the world’s most important sea lines of communication. The closure of the straits to international navigation may adversely affect the well-being of the global economy. On February 11, 2022, the Biden administration announced the new Indo-Pacific strategy, which will continue to deliver on AUKUS. For centuries, the proposed Thai Canal Project has been planned to revolutionize the shipping industry by bypassing the busy waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. If the canal is built under the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the pre-eminence of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will not last long. This article analyzes the potential increase of navigation of nuclear-powered submarines through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and its ensuing environmental implications from a viewpoint of international law. It discusses effects of the proposed canal plan in influencing the shipping industry should this “dream waterway” be constructed.

This research attempts to identify the issues which make it more difficult to safeguard transboundary protected areas in the ASEAN countries. The research has found that national forest law, which relates only to the territory of each country, is not sufficient to safeguard the transboundary protected areas that spread across the boundaries of two or more countries. There is no national law, regional convention, or bilateral agreement among the ASEAN countries which directly provides for the conservation of transboundary protected areas. This author has adopted a legal approach to the protection of transboundary protected areas in Europe and has proposed that a regional convention or agreement should be used as an instrument to promote cooperation and sustainable management for the conservation of transboundary protected areas and to deal with problems that do not stop at national borders. The relevant domestic laws should be consistent with such a prospective regional convention or agreement.

Forty years have passed since the UNCLOS was adopted and it is necessary to reexamine its successes and failures. This article will set out to check the four legislative features of the UNCLOS and then make some suggestions. From the aspect of legislative technique, the UNCLOS is extensive with an ambitious framework but is vague in details. From the aspect of a principled position, meanwhile, its provisions are mainly beneficial to countries with long and unimpeded sea lines but not to landlocked countries, short coastlines, or an impeded outward extension. From the aspect of rights and interest division, the division of maritime rights and interests of countries in the UNCLOS is not operational in practice. From the aspect of dispute resolution, it has constructed an ambitious mechanism accommodating various international judicial institutions, which is, however, too complicated, lacks focus, and has loopholes. The international community should consider revising and improving the Convention in view of certain shortcomings and deficiencies in its legislative features

Biopiracy, largely defined as misappropriation and intellectual property control of biological resources and associated traditional knowledge, has long had profound adverse impacts on the lives of the people and communities in developing countries, including Southeast Asia, one of the global biodiversity hotspots. Given that patents are the main means used in most biopiracy cases to exploit resources and knowledge, this article will discuss its feasibility as the other policy instrument to tackle biopiracy in Southeast Asia and suggest how it should be established and/or improved. For this purpose, this article examines two policy instruments in the patent regime that can be and have been used to address the aforementioned problem: compulsory licensing and the disclosure requirement. Based on the analysis of these two instruments, this article discusses why compulsory licensing is an unlikely means of tackling the problem and suggests how a disclosure requirement can be established or improved to tackle biopiracy in the region.

게임 아이템 불법 매매 및 음란사이트 이용 등의 사이버 이용에 대한 처벌이 강화되 고 있는데 반해, 청소년의 무분별한 이용은 여전히 증가하고 있다. 특히 보호관찰대상 청소년의 이와 같은 사이버 일탈의 비행문제에 대한 실증연구를 통해 보호관찰대상 청소년의 비행 및 문제 행동의 예방책을 강구하고자 이 연구에서는 보호관찰 대상 청 소년의 사이버 일탈에 대한 영향요인을 법준수 인식과 자기통제력의 요인을 검증하고 자 하였다. 이를 위하여 2018년 한국형사법무정책연구원의 『소년원생의 안정적 사회 정착을 위한 실태조사 및 정책지원 방안 연구』의 패널데이터 1차 자료를 활용하였다. 총 463개의 자료를 중심으로 하되, 주요변수의 무응답 또는 결측값이 높은 변수들을 제외하고 총 459명의 자료를 활용하여 최종분석에 활용하였다. SPSS 28.0ver 통계프 로그램을 활용하여 주요변수들의 빈도분석, 교차분석, 신뢰도 분석을 실시하였고, 최 종분석으로 보호관찰 대상 청소년의 사이버 일탈에 대한 영향요인 검증을 위한 로지 스틱 회귀분석을 실시하였다. 연구결과 자기통제력은 사이버 일탈의 영향요인으로 나타나지 않았으나, 법준수 인식이 사이버 일탈에 유의미한 영향관계로 나타났다. 법준 수 인식이 높을수록 유의미하게 사이버 일탈을 하지 않는 것으로 나타나, 게임 아이템 불법 거래와 음란사이트 이용 등이 법에 저촉될 수 있는 행위임을 강조한 법준수 인식 교육이 보호관찰 대상 청소년에게 강화될 필요가 있다.

기후변화로 인하여 해수면 상승이 발생하고 있고, 그로 인한 악영향에 대해 연안국을 비롯한 국제사회의 우려가 커지고 있다. 해수면 상승으로 해안선이 후퇴하고 섬등 해양지형물이 수몰되는 경우 그러한 해안선을 기점으로 설정된 연안국 관할해역 외측한계의 변경 가능성, 기존 해양경계획정조약의 개정 필요성, 섬 또는 암석이 암석 또는 수중암초로 변경됨에 따른 법적 지위의 변화 등 많은 국 제해양법적 쟁점을 발생시키고 있다. 이 논문에서는 해수면 상승이 국제해양법에 미치는 효과에 한정하여, 쟁점별로 소도서개발도상국, 세계국제법학회, 유엔 국제법위원회의 주장을 검토하고 유엔해양법협약의 해석론적 측면에서 해결방안을 제시하였다.

본 연구는 수용자가 유해간행물에는 해당하지 않으나 청소년유해간행물로 지정된 선정적 내용을 담은 도서를 구입하고 교정기관에 반입하고자 한 사안에서, 교정기관 은 「형의 집행 및 수용자의 처우에 관한 법률」 제47조 제2항에서 수용자가 구독을 신 청한 도서가 「출판문화산업 진흥법」에 따른 유해간행물이 아닐 경우에는 구독을 허가 하여야 한다는 의무 규정으로 인해 위 도서의 교부신청에 대해 거부처분을 하는 것은 재량권을 일탈･남용한 위법한 처분에 해당한다는 판결에서 시작되었다. 수용자는 형 집행의 대상자로서 신체의 자유가 제한되어 교정기관에서 생활하게 되 나 그 과정에서 기본권을 보장받아야 하는 존재라는 점은 당연하다. 위 사안에서 수용 자는 청소년유해간행물 교부가 불허되자 알 권리 및 소비자로서의 권리의 침해를 받 았다고 주장했다. 수용자의 기본권 보장･인권 보호 측면에서 알 권리의 충족은 이루어 져야 한다는 점은 다툼의 여지가 없다 할 것이나 자극적인 내용을 통해 왜곡된 성인식 을 심어 줄 여지가 있어 청소년유해간행물로 지정된 도서가 수용자의 알 권리의 대상에 포함되어 교정기관에 아무런 제재 없이 반입되어야 하는지에 대해서는 논의가 필 요해 보인다. 이러한 맥락에서 수용자에게 음란한 도서를 포함한 범죄 관련 내용이 담 긴 서적들을 교부하는 것이 타당한 것인지, 그런 도서들이 수용자의 건전한 사회 복귀 및 교정･교화에 부정적인 영향을 미치는 것은 아닌지에 대한 의문이 드는 것도 사실이 다. 더욱이 해당 도서의 교부신청자가 왜곡된 성인식을 지닌 성범죄라면 이를 허가하 는 것이 국민의 법 감정에 부합하지 않다는 점에서 더욱 그러하다. 관련하여 신문･잡지 또는 도서는 「형의 집행 및 수용자의 처우에 관한 법률」 제27 조에서 규정하고 있는 금품(돈과 물품을 아우르는 말)에 해당하기도 하므로, 수용자가 외부로부터 금품을 반입하려면 수형자의 교화 또는 건전한 사회복귀를 해칠 우려 및 시설의 안전 또는 질서를 해칠 우려가 없는 경우에만 가능하다. 그렇다면 음란한 내용 이 포함된 도서는 교화 또는 건전한 사회복귀 등에 악영향을 준다고 볼 여지가 상당하 므로 반입을 불허할 수도 있다는 주장도 제기된 바 있으나 반입 대상 물품이 출판물이 라는 점에서 구독은 허가하면서 교부를 불허하는 것은 모순이라는 지적이 있었다. 결국 「형의 집행 및 수용자의 처우에 관한 법률」 제47조가 「출판문화산업 진흥법」 에서 정한 유해간행물 외에는 그 구독신청을 불허가할 수 없도록 분명하게 규정하고 있는 이상, ‘수형자의 교화 또는 건전한 사회복귀를 해칠 우려’등과 같은 일반적인 목 적만 내세워서 수용자의 알 권리를 제한할 수는 없다. 법률 규정이 제대로 마련되지 않는다면 교정기관에서는 과도한 재량권을 행사할 수 밖에 없고 이는 위법한 행정처 분으로 귀결될 가능성이 매우 높으므로 궁극적으로는 교정행정 인력과 비용이 낭비되 는 결과를 초래한다. 따라서 출판물 반입 등과 관련한 문제는 입법을 통해 해결할 수 밖에 없고, 개정안을 통해 당면한 현실적 문제를 풀어가는 것이 바람직하다.