Many measurement methods for understanding consumers’ acceptable price range have been developed. Among these, Price Sensitivity Meter (PSM) is one of the most popular. It has been regarded as a convenient research method because of the ease of data collection and data processing. In particular, PSM requires only four questions to determine the price range. Nevertheless, it also has some problems from a theoretical viewpoint. The purpose of the present research is to develop a new price research method for measuring consumers’ acceptable price range. In particular, applying survival analysis to data prepared for PSM, Japanese consumers’ price acceptance ranges for several categories were estimated.

Multichannel sales strategies are now very popular owing to the prevalence of the Internet, which makes it much easier for manufacturers to engage in direct sales. Because direct channels, including catalogs and the Internet, compete against, substitute for, or complement conventional retail channels, finding the best way to utilize them in conjunction with retail channels continues to be a challenge for many firms. Specifically, multiple channels give rise to channel conflict when the channels compete for almost the same market with substitutable products. To avoid this channel conflict, some manufacturers, such as Daimler, Nikon, and Rubbermaid, have used the Internet as a medium to provide information about their products and/or to point users of the Internet to the nearest retailer carrying the product, but without offering the product for sale directly over the Internet. Dell, which is arguably the most successful Internet marketer in the personal computer market, opened kiosk locations in shopping malls across the US from 2002, and has operated full-scale manufacturer-owned stores since late 2006. However, in 2008, Dell shut down all of its kiosks in the US and instead expanded into retail stores, such as Wal-Mart and Best Buy. Furthermore, IBM redirects orders taken at ibm.com to its distributors in an attempt to mitigate the conflict, and HP gives their intermediaries a commission fee for orders placed online. In the context of multichannel management, the question of to what degree a manufacturer should set a direct price to coordinate all channels has commanded significant attention from both academic and practical viewpoints. However, marketing research addressing when a manufacturer should determine the direct price is missing from the existing literature, although it is a critical practical issue for manufacturers that adopt a multichannel sales strategy. Given the current status of the literature, this paper investigates the optimal timing of pricing by a manufacturer managing two types of marketing channel, a retail channel and a direct channel, using a dynamic noncooperative game framework. Traditionally, analytical marketing models describing channel conflict between these two channels examine price competition where the retail and direct prices are established simultaneously. In contrast to this conventional approach, our model demonstrates that such a simultaneous price competition never arises if the manufacturer and retailer can choose not only the level of price, but also the timing of pricing. If the manufacturer has sold products wholesale to a retailer presuming that the manufacturer will set the direct price before the retailer prices, the retailer accelerates the timing of retail pricing prior to the direct price setting by the manufacturer. Our findings suggest that the manufacturer should post the direct price before or upon, but not after, selling products wholesale to a retailer. Such upfront posting of the direct price not only constitutes the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the noncooperative game between channel members, but also maximizes profits for the manufacturer. The logic behind this outcome is as follows. If the manufacturer determines the Despite the significant amount of marketing research on multichannel management, an overview of the literature suggests that research incorporating the choice of optimal pricing timing into channel operation issues is completely lacking, despite the fact that the timing for posting the direct price is a crucial problem for manufacturers. That is, the existing marketing literature treats the order of moves of channel members as exogenously given, which is rather surprising because each member is expected to maximize its own profits in the context of a standard price-setting game. From a multichannel management perspective, this paper addresses the issue of the endogenous order of moves by adopting the established observable delay game framework (e.g., Hamilton and Slutsky 1990). Therefore, it is worth noting that the present paper is the first to introduce the idea of endogenous choice of decision timing in the field of marketing research. Our findings imply that the addition of a direct channel and the posting of a direct price after the sale of a substantial number of products through a traditional retail channel—a common multichannel strategy in practice—is inferior from the viewpoint of overall profit maximization. If a manufacturer employs such a strategy, it fails to coordinate the marketing channels and to maximize the channel profits. Indeed, as noted at the beginning of this section, many dominant manufacturers in various industries have withdrawn their direct channels. Our model effectively explains such real cases, providing useful managerial insights for business practitioners.

Steel manufacturers in the Korean steel reinforcement market are facing increasing competition. Construction businesses are in a recession because demands have decreased, too many facilities have been built, and more imported materials are coming from Japan and China. Korean steel manufacturers focus on domestic sales as a result of these difficulties in the business environment. To overcome these difficulties, manufacturers must find strategies for producing high value products, minimizing distribution expenses, and reducing costs. However, such temporary expedients are insufficient. Accordingly, our study investigating steel manufacturer salespersons and agents that purchase supplies uncovered suggestions for remaining competitive. First, companies must outdo their competitors by offering more competitive prices. Second, they must be ahead of their competitors in announcing their prices. Companies can present their expected selling prices by analyzing their manufacturing costs, future market unit costs, and distribution unit costs of the present market. If they select prices for products they will sell in the next month, the data indicate that they can still expect to make profits. The lowest selling price is calculated by analyzing the manufacturing costs. By setting prices more rapidly than competitors, manufacturers should increase their market share by increasing sales volume.

Antitrust deals with the competitive consequences of conduct by firms in the market. Marketing places emphasis on understanding how firms compete from individual perspective; by studying the thinking and motivations of managers and purchase preferences of consumers. As an academic discipline marketing aims to describe and predict the performance of companies engaged in exchange to reach organizational goals (Gundlach, Phillips, & Desrochers, 2002). For antitrust, the complementary nature of marketing's constitutes in providing a basis for understanding the nature of competitive conduct and the welfare of consumers. The influence of antitrust on marketing strategy raises many concerns. There is a strand of literature investigating how the antitrust law perceives different marketing activities. Many common marketing practices are coming under greater scrutiny from regulators, antitrust lawyers and scholars. It is essential for companies to understand how that will affect competition. When considering marketing issues such as distribution policy, product line extension, enhancing the company’s positive image, they may not realize the increasing likelihood of violating antitrust laws (Bush & Gelb, 2005). Brodley (1982) analyzes how joint ventures may threaten competition by falsifying competitive incentives among joint venture participants. He describes various incentive-modifying remedies that mitigate anticompetitive risks, and then applies this presumptive approach to various types of joint ventures. Some papers analyze how antimonopoly decisions can influence management of transaction. Joskow (2002) shows the importance of the application of transaction cost economics (TCE) to antitrust legal rules and antitrust remedies specification because it may result in different legal rules comparing to cases ignoring TCE ideas. He emphasizes that antitrust legal rules must be sensitive to the information and analytical capabilities of institutions in the market, the characteristics of potential anticompetitive behavior, market structures etc. Not only the development of marketing practices challenges antitrust enforcement. Antitrust policy can impose significant and long-lasting restrictions on marketing policies of companies, including pricing decisions. One relevant for Russia example is pricing antitrust remedies under the merger deals clearance or investigations on the abuse of dominance. In order to prevent abuse in a form of excessive price antitrust authorities set ‘soft price cap’ on the domestic market price using different benchmarks including quotes in the world commodity markets, price of export contracts, price of export contracts net of transport cost and custom duties, best (lowest) price of export contract etc. This type of remedies is already applied for chemicals, electric steel, cocking coal, aluminum and other commodities. Reform of tariff regulation in Russia takes this path also: from the next year price cap for natural gas for industrial customers will be set at the level of contract price of the largest supplier Gazprom net of transport cost. We argue that this type of remedies being imposed in order to protect customers of dominant company can diminish incentives to compete, along with the restricting incentives for an efficiency-improvement. This paper investigates how soft price regulation affects companies` behavior. In many regulated industries over the world price cap as a method of price regulation replaces cost-plus pricing. It is a kind of incentive regulation introduced in order to enhance productive efficiency by strengthening sellers’ incentives for cost reduction (Laffont, 1993; Cabral & Riordan, 1989) as well as incentives for more efficient pricing. A price-cap regulation might be suggested to address the market by making it extremely difficult for the industry to use price as a marketing strategy and by reducing the available sources the industry has for spending on marketing and lobbying. However pricing under cap is not neutral for competition in the market. We argue that the impact of price cap regulation on market competition depends on the design of cap. More specifically if cap for one (regulated) market depends on the price of the supplier in other (non-regulated) market, there is sub-type of price cap regulation (known in Russian tariff regulation as ‘netback minus’) that enhance incentives to collude in non-regulated market. Traditionally impact of price caps on collusion is analyzed in the framework of focal point problem. Price ceilings might weaken competition serving as collusive focal points for pricing decisions (Schelling, 1960; Scherer & Ross, 1990). According to the Folk Theorem (Tirole, 1988) any individually rational prices can occur as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently high discount factor. In collusive equilibrium, companies face a coordination problem so that price ceilings may become a focal point on which companies may coordinate. It means that price ceilings may facilitate tacit collusion, increase its stability and lead to higher prices on the market. In addition, price ceilings may become a signal that if firms charge prices below that level than they would not be investigated for collusion by government authorities. Thus, it becomes less risky to maintain collusion at price level that government assess as binding. There is a strand of literature providing the empirical evidence for a collusive focal-point effect of price ceilings in different markets. Knittel and Stango (2003), studying data on state-level price ceilings on credit card charges during the 1980s, find that companies used state-level price ceilings as focal points to sustain tacit collusion. Ma (2007) investigates price ceilings in Taiwan’s flour market and argues that firms set prices above competitive levels during most of the regulation period. Moreover, all flour firms set their prices equal to ceilings. Some studies try to explain the existence of asymmetric retail price adjustments to crude oil price or wholesale price shocks by market power and possible collusion effects (Deltas, 2008; Borenstein, Cameron, & Gilbert, 1997). Sen, Clemente and Jonker (2011) evaluating the effects of price ceiling on retail gasoline prices in Eastern Canada 1999-2007 find the evidence that the enactment of such regulation is significantly correlated with higher prices. A potential explanation is that price ceilings serve as focal points stimulating firms to set higher prices. In contrast, laboratory experiments do not find a collusive focal-point effect of price ceilings. Coursey and Smith (1983) find convergence to the competitive equilibrium prices and no collusive effects of price ceilings in posted-offer markets. Despite in the design of Coursey and Smith (1983) the incentives to collude are small, Engelmann and Normann (2009) also find the evidence against the focal-point hypothesis, who study posted-offer markets with four symmetric sellers but larger incentives for collusion at the price ceiling. Finally, Engelmann and Muller (2011) results again fail to support the focal-point hypothesis. Collusion is as unlikely in markets with a price ceiling as in markets with unconstrained pricing. The possible explanation for different results in the laboratory and in the field is the lack of the focal-point effect in the field. The field results might be driven by other factors. These might include explicit collusion (which might either be triggered by the introduction of the price ceiling or might be easier to keep up in its presence) or other reasons that the empirical studies failed to control for (Engelmann & Muller, 2011). However the design of our research differs from ‘focal point’ approach. It is much closer to the literature on the multimarket contacts (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Spagnolo, 1999). Multimarket contacts was also analyzed in the context of multimarket rivalry (Phillips & Mason, 1996) but not from the point of view of cap design as we do. The goal of this paper is to show the mechanism by means of which the establishment of the domestic regulated prices ceiling can promote the stability of collusion and conditions at which it occurs. Intuition of the paper is the following. Under price cap which depends on price in deregulated market deviation from collusion in this market decreases profit in regulated market (in the punishment phase). In the model we think about regulated market as domestic and about completely deregulated market as world market. Under certain conditions the establishment of a price ceiling of domestic market by the principle "price would not excess of the world price" can promote the collusion stability in the world market. We argue that there is an unexpected ratio between the principle of the internal price establishment based on a world indicative and collusion incentives: the difference between the world and internal price to which the regulator aspires is higher, the negative impact of this practice on the competition is higher. Not all the versions of price cap which are based on the world market benchmark provide the same impact on the incentive to collude. Other important variables which reflect transport cost (or more generally all cost of trade). Price cup under model ‘world price plus trade (transport) cost’ provides no impact on the incentives to collude under some level of trade (transport) cost. Price cap under model ‘world price minus trade (transport) cost’ supports the collusion to the greatest extent. This paper represents an interesting focus for the marketing field. The price cap for domestic customer influences companies` incentives to collude in the world markets. Thus, marketing needs to recognize the incentives for cooperative behavior as a strategic marketing tool under soft price cap. Important implication is that pricing remedies imposed on Russian exporting companies will affect prices for the customers of their international competitors.

In the last years a lot of research focused on functional food (FF) whose first definition was set in Japan, in the 1980s, for “food products fortified with special constituents that possess advantageous physiological effects” (Siro et al., 2008). The main research interest was on the reasons and motives of FF consumption (Annunziata, 2013; Bhaskaran & Hardley, 2002; Bonanno, 2012; Siro et al., 2008; Verbeke, 2005; Verbeke et al., 2009), and the price and affordability resulted among the main criteria at the basis of the consumers’ decisions. Notwithstanding the increasing importance of the FF market and of the price within the basket of FF products attributes, surprisingly, no studies has so far analyzed the capacity of consumers to correctly recall FF prices. The objective of this research is to examine the determinants of shoppers’ in-store price recall for functional yoghurt and fermented milk products (FY). The determinants are grouped as follows: - Products’ characteristics: Price promotion, Brand, Claim type - Shoppers’ socio-economic characteristics: Gender, Age, Level of education, Perceived Family income - Shoppers’ purchasing behavior: Functional yoghurt purchase frequency, Yoghurt category purchase frequency, Share-of-requirement, Reason of consumption Research interviews were carried out inside three large supermarket buildings in an average size Italian city. Shoppers were selected among the ones who chose a FY. Face-to-face questioning at the point of sale after the selection or purchase if something from the corresponding product category was bought is a widely adopted and tested method (Dickson & Sawyer, 1990; Evanschitzky et al., 2004; Le Boutillier et al., 1994; Monroe & Lee, 1999; Olavarrieta et al., 2012; Vanhuele & Dreze, 2002) and ensures shoppers’ interest, knowledge, familiarity with the products under investigation. The research applies the Dickson ad Sawyer’s (1990) methodology which was integrated with a filter question so to select only the already functional yoghurt customers, that is excluding first-purchase functional yoghurt shopper, which could create a bias due to the more intense purchasing and selection process that a first-purchase determines. The survey covered 207 shoppers, with a high representation of females (80.2%), with all ages equally represented, with good level of education (61% with Senior High School Diploma and above), and half employed and half unemployed. Price recall accuracy dependent variable was calculated adopting two indicators, commonly adopted in research on price accuracy and knowledge: the percentage absolute deviation or price recall accuracy indicator (PAD) and the price knowledge score (PKS). 24.6% of shoppers responded correctly, 38.2% responded within a 5% error from the correct price, and 20.3% declare not to know the correct price and did not attempt any answer. The research tests 11 hypotheses through a logistic regressions on a binary dependent variable measuring price recall by correct responses regarding a price (including incorrect responses ± 1% - 25.6%), or not correct responses (74.4%). Antecedent variables were included in the equation as independent variables. The model demonstrates a high prediction accuracy (74.4%), and the overall fit statistic (p-value for the Chi-square test=0.000) indicates a good level of fit between the hypothesized model and the data. Results show that shoppers’ price recall is more likely to be good when FY is on promotion, if there is high purchase frequency, if the FY is bought mainly for ‘hedonistic’ motivation, if the FY claim is the reduction of risks of disease. As far as socio-demographic information are concerned, results show that men (vs. women), younger shoppers (vs. older), high educated people (vs. low educated), and shoppers with perceived adequate family income (vs. inadequate income) have a higher propensity to a correct price recall. The present research expands knowledge on price recall determinants and on functional food purchasing experience. As other studies on price knowledge, this research suggests that shoppers do not follow rational criteria in assigning their resources and that the information available are variably processed and intertwined with personal motives of consumption. Functional food purchasing experience does not differ from the conventional food, as far as yoghurt is concerned. Similarly to conventional food, promotion and higher purchase frequency increases price recall accuracy. Limitations of the present research are that only one functional food, even though the category with the highest turnover worldwide, was investigated. Moreover, even though the sample includes a number of shoppers similar to past studies, the sample is only partially representative of the Italian consumers. Finally, a better balance in the sample between male and female shoppers would bolster the basis for the results. To conclude, these findings provide important insights for managers who make pricing strategies for a product with worldwide growing sales, but whose main selling obstacle is the high market price.

Intrigued by the recent emergence and success of low-cost airlines, which use the additive option price framing (as opposed to the subtractive option price framing used by the traditional full-service airlines), we attempted to develop and empirically test a theoretical model that can help better understand the success of this innovative pricing practice for optional services. Drawing on the prospect theory and the loss aversion and endowment effect theory, we argue that option price framing affect customer responses such as perceived risk, perceived price fairness and affect. Further, we propose interaction effects between option framing and product type (utilitarian vs. hedonic) on perceived risk. Using a quasi-experimental design, we constructed four scenarios (2 option price framings x 2 product types). We administered the scenario-based survey among part-time MBA students (full-time managers). Analysis results of 132 responses demonstrated that customer responses in perceived risk, perceived fairness and affect were more favorable in the additive option framing, which in turn led to higher purchase intention. Further, these effects were stronger for utilitarian products. For hedonic products, no difference in perceived risk was observed between the two option price framings. Consequently, our study offered an explanation for when and why the additive option price framing might work better.

Prior research has investigated the consumer effects of cash and card payments in service settings, but the growing trend of innovative payment with a mobile device hasn’t been considered in the literature so fare. This article represents one of the first studies that considers the adoption of mobile as a new payment method and investigate how the ‘checkout’ phase affect the shoppers’ overall price image of retail stores (OSPI). Results from our studies show that the ‘checkout’ phase is the ‘moment of truth’ for shoppers judging OSPI. We investigate the effects of cash, card, and mobile payments and show that the less transparent a payment method, the lower OSPI judgments of shoppers. In particular, favorable comparisons of basket prices to shoppers’ mental budgets trigger lower store price perceptions. Subsequently, these results have major implications for retailers aiming to lower their OSPI in customers’ minds.

For retailers price promotions are an important instrument to increase store visits. Building on prior research on the role of emotions in decision making processes we show a strong mediating effect of both valence and arousal on store visit intentions. Therefore, managers should be aware of emotional responses when planning their price promotions.

본 연구에서는 2007년부터 2012년 초까지 최저 수출가격제 도가 베트남의 쌀 수출시장과 베트남 국내시장에 미치는 영향 을 분석하였다. 그동안 베트남의 쌀 관련 수출정책은 베트남 국내뿐만 아니라 수출시장에서도 중요한 역할을 했지만, 이에 대한 분석은 거의 이루어지지 않았다. 특히, 2001년부터 시행 된 최저 수출가격제도는 베트남의 식량안보와 자국 내 가격 안정 등에 미치는 영향이 매우 컸음에도 이에 대한 연구는 거 의 없었다. 이 논문은 베트남의 쌀 관련 수출정책, 그 가운데에 서도 최저 수출가격제도의 효과를 분석하는 데 초점을 두었다. 이 논문에서는 베트남 주요 쌀 생산 지역의 쌀 가격과 월 별 쌀 수출가격, 수출량과 최저수출가격을 비교하고 실증 분 석을 통해 베트남 쌀시장의 최저수출가격제도의 정책 효과를 분석하였다. 분석 결과, 최저 수출가격제도는 수출 물량을 제 한하고 국내 공급 물량을 증가시킴으로써 국내시장 가격을 안 정시키는 데 기여한 것으로 나타났다. 특히, 세계 쌀 가격이 크게 폭등하던 2008년에 베트남 국내 가격을 안정시키는 데 가장 효과가 컸던 것으로 나타났다. 이 정책을 통해 베트남 정부는 국제 쌀 가격이 폭등하던 시기에 자국 내 소비자를 보 호할 수 있었다. 최저 수출가격제도로 인한 쌀 수출 감소와 사회후생 효과를 분석한 결과, 수출가격을 낮게 유지함으로써 소비자는 일부 혜 택을 보지만, 생산자의 후생은 크게 감소하여, 사회 전체적인 후생은 감소하는 것으로 나타났다. 최저 수출가격제도를 유지 함으로써 나타나는 경제적 손실이 있음에도, 베트남 정부가 최 저 수출가격제도를 유지하려고 하는 것은 정치적인 이유 때문 으로 보인다. 베트남의 1인당 국민소득은 2012년 기준 1,500 달러에 미치지 못한다. 그만큼 사회적으로 취약계층이 많다는 의미이다. 따라서 경제적인 측면에서는 다소 손해가 있더라도, 자국 내 소비자를 일정 정도 보호하기 위한 목적 때문에 최저 수출가격제도를 운영하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 본 논문에서 베트남의 쌀 수출에 대한 국제 수요 변화를 예 측하기 위한 구체적인 모델을 설정하지 않았다. 즉, 베트남 국 내시장 및 수출시장에 미치는 영향을 엄밀히 분석하기 위해서 는 구체적인 수요 및 공급함수를 추정해야 한다. 하지만 이 연구에서는 자료의 한계로 인해 구체적인 함수를 추정하지 않 고 다양한 탄성치를 가정하여 효과를 분석하였다. 이는 이 연 구가 가지고 있는 한계로 향후 자료가 확보된다면, 좀더 엄밀한 분석이 가능할 것이다. 하지만 베트남이 운영하고 있는 최 저 수출가격제도의 효과를 이해하는 데는 큰 무리가 없을 것 으로 판단된다. 최저 수출 가격 제도는 국내 가격을 안정시키는 효과도 있 지만, 농가 소득에도 영향을 미친다. 또한, 생산자와 유통업자, 수출업자 사이의 이익 분배에도 영향을 미친다. 이에 대한 연 구도 최저 수출가격제도의 효과를 분석하는 측면에서 매우 중 요하지만, 이 연구에서는 연구상의 제약으로 이에 대한 분석 은 포함하지 않았다.

본 연구는 다양한 특성을 지닌 주택의 경제적 가치를 평가하기 위해 최적의 주택 가격 결정 모형을 추정하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이 연구는 두 가지 접근 방법으로 서울시 아파트 가격을 분석한다. 첫째, 선형회귀모형, 공간회귀모형, 그리고 다층모형 등 기존의 방법론을 기초로 주택가격 결정요인을 설명하고, 둘째, 공간적 특성을 반영한 다층모형을 새롭게 적용하여 분석 결과를 비교했다. 구체적으로 매매가격과 전세가격을 설명하는 과정에서 아파트의 물리적 특성, 해당 지역의 주변환경, 교육환경, 지역속성을 반영하였다. 연구 결과 공간적 특성을 반영한 다층모형의 설명력이 가장 높은 것으로 확인되었다. 이 연구는 기존의 부동산 관련 연구들이 공간적인 요소를 고려하지 못한다는 제약을 극복하고 가격 결정 요인 분석 결과를 통해 경제 정책 수립을 위한 주택시장 진단에 도움이 되는 지리정보를 제공할 것으로 기대된다.

본 연구에서는 먼저 이론상으로 환율을 고려하고 나면 동일하여야 하는 DR과 원주의 균형가격이 이루어지고 있는지 분석하였다. 다음으로는 여전히 발생하고 있는 가격괴리현상에 대하여 어떠한 요인이 이러한 괴리현상을 설명할 수 있는지를 찾아보았다. 마지막으로는 점진적인 자본시장 자유화 진행에 따라서 원주와 DR과의 가격괴리 현상에 어떠한 변화가 발생했는지를 알아보았다. 분석결과 먼저 DR과 원주 가격 사이에 차이가 존재하며, 특히 DR가격이 환율을 고려한 내재가격에 비하여 할증되어 거래된다는 것을 발견하였다. 또한 이러한 가격괴리현상은 시간이 경과함에 따라 변하는 것으로 나타났다. DR과 원주의 가격에 차이를 발생시키는 요인에 대해서 살펴본 결과, 원․달러 환율의 변화가 DR할증에 통계적으로 유의한 양(+)의 영향을, KOSPI지수 수익률과 MSCI지수 수익률은 DR할증에 각각 음(-)과 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 기업규모가 DR할증에 미치는 영향력은 ADR과 GDR에서 각각 음(-)과 양(+)으로 서로 상반된 유의한 결과가 도출되었으며 ADR과 GDR을 모두 합한 분석에서는 그 효과가 서로 상쇄되어 기업규모가 DR할증에 아무런 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타나고 있다. 배당의 경우는 DR할증에 양(+)의 영향을, DR의 변동성은 DR 할증에 음(-)의 영향을 그리고 ADR시장에 국한해서는 거래량이 많을수록 DR할증에 음(-)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 반면, 정보비대칭에 기인한 것인지를 파악하기 위하여 활용된 외국인 보유지분율만이 유일하게 통계상 비유의하게 나타났다. 본 연구를 통하여 동일 재화에 대한 두 자산 DR과 원주의 가격이 다름을 확인하였으며, 그러한 이유로 시장별 투자자심리와 거래장소에 따른 차이, 유동성과 거래비용 등에 따른 차이, 서로 상이한 위험에 대한 인식과 태도, 그리고 정보비대칭에 기인한 가격차이가 나타났음을 확인하였으며, 또한 그 차이는 시간이 경과함에 따라 변한다는 것을 발견하였다.

인터넷이 상품거래의 새로운 공간으로 등장한 것은 이미 오래 전의 일이고, 최근 일부 분야는 오 히려 오프라인 시장 보다 온라인 시장이 상품거래 의 주된 무대가 되고 있다. 종래부터 제조업자는 자 신이 제조한 상품이 유통업자에 의해 다시 판매될 경우에 적용되는 이른바 재판매가격에 대하여 일 정한 제한을 가하려는 시도를 해왔고, 이러한 재판 매가격유지행위(RPM)에 대하여는 공정거래법에 의해 일정한 규제가 이루어져 왔다. 이러한 현상은 인터넷 상거래의 경우에도 동일하게 발생할 수 있 고 실제로 미국에서는 이른바 인터넷최소광고가격 통제행위(IMAP)를 어떻게 취급할 것인지에 대한 논의가 한창 이루어지고 있다. 우리 공정거래법은 수직적 경쟁제한행위 중 가 격제한행위와 비가격제한행위를 각각 다르게 규율 하고 있고, 위 인터넷최소광고가격통제행위는 표 면적으로는 광고에 대한 제한으로서 비가격적 제 한행위의 성격을 가지지만, 실질적으로는 가격에 영향을 미치는 특성이 존재하는바, 이 논문에서는 우리 법상 이를 어떻게 취급할 것인지에 대하여 다 루어 보고자 한다. 논의에 앞서 재판매가격유지행 위와 관련한 기존의 당연위법의 원칙과 최근 미국 연방대법원 및 우리 대법원판결에 의해 제시된 합 리의 원칙에 관하여 살피기로 한다.

Recently, the mineral resource protection policies and regulations in production countries of natural resources including rare metals are becoming more stringent. Such environment makes which market has malfunction. In other word, those are not perfect or pure market. Therefore because each market of natural resources have special or unique characters, it is difficult to forecast their market prices. In this study, we constructed several models to estimate prices of natural resources using ARIMA and their business indices. And for examples, Indium and Coal were introduced.

본 연구는 244,443 도체로부터 얻은 도체특성(성별, 등지방두께 및 도체중), 사육환경(자돈의 성별 분리사육, 돈사의 온도관리 유무, 돈사의 형태, 환기방식, 급수원의 종류, 음수 개선시설의 유무, 돈사의 연간 소독횟수, 돈사의 바닥형태 및 평당 사육두수), 출하방법(선별출하, 출하일령, 등지방두께의 편차 및 도체중의 편차) 및 번식특성과 자돈관리(모돈의 산차, 이유일령, 정액의 분양처 및 자돈의 품종)등의 자료를 바탕으로 돼지의 도체가격에 미치는 영향을 분석하기 위해 실시하였다. 도체특성 변수에서 암퇘지 및 거세돈이 숫퇘지보다 높은 가격을 형성하였으며(p<0.05), 등지방두께 15-29mm 및 도체중 91-95kg가 높은 도체가격을 보였다(p<0.05). 도체가격에 대한 등지방 두께 및 도체중은 도체가격 형성에 각각 90.75%와 90.23%를 차지하였다. 하지만, 사육환경, 출하방법, 번식관리는 각각의 방법별로 가격에 유의적인 차이를 보였으나, 도체가격형성에는 낮은 영향을 미쳤다. 이상의 결과 여러 가지 변수 중 등지방 두께 및 도체중이 도체가격에 큰 영향을 미친 것으로 나타났다.

국내보리의 수매중단에 따른 원료곡 수급의 대책을 마련하기위한 기초자료로 보리를 이용한 가공제품을 생산하고 있는 전국의 가공업체 현황과 시중에 유통되고 있는 가공제품의 종류와 가격을 조사하고 이들의 품질정도를 분석한 결과는 다음과 같다. 1. 전국적으로 수집된 보리가공제품(주류제외)에 의해 조사된 보리가공업체의 수는 153개였으며 시도별로는 경기 >충북 >전남 >전북 >경북 >경남 =충남 >강원 >서울 순이었다. 2. 보리함유 가공제품(주류제외)의 품목 수는 17개였으며 가공제품의 수는 240종이었다. 3. 보리가공제품의 품목별 수는 혼합곡 >찰보리쌀 >일반보리쌀 >미숫가루 >보리차 >엿기름 >압맥 >보리과자류 순이었다. 4. 보리가공업체가 생산하는 제품의 종류는 평균 1.6종이었으며 전체업종의 68%가 1 ~ 2 종류를 생산하며, 5종 이상을 생산하는 업체도 13%정도 되었다. 5. 보리쌀 제품류별 유통가격은 압맥(찰성) >흑맥(메성) >할맥(메성) >찰보리쌀 >압맥(메성) >메보리쌀 순이었다. 6. 친환경제품은 일반제품에 비해 평균 41%정도 가격이 높았으며 제품에 따라 12~93%의 가격 차이를 보였고, 차이가 큰 순으로는 보리차 >찰보리쌀 >압맥 >미숫가루 >혼합곡이였다. 7. 동일품목 내에서도 가공업체에 따른 차이는 미숫가루가 가장 커서 최고가가 최저가의 4배 이상이고, 보리차음료(PET병), 보리차(티백), 찰보리쌀(친환경)은 3배 이상의 차이를 보였다. 8. 찰보리쌀 제품 42종 중 찰성순도가 높은 제품이 13종, 찰성과 메성이 혼합된 제품이 26종, 완전 메성인 제품이 3종이었으나, 찰성순도와 이들의 가격 간에는 관련이 없었으며 오히려 찰성순도가 낮은 제품이 비싼 경우도 있었다. 9. 메보리쌀 제품 34종 중 표시가 잘못된 찰성 보리쌀 제품이 1종 있었고, 찰성과 메성이 혼합된 제품이 2종 있었다. 10. 보리 엿기름제품 30종의 평균 효소력가는 131oL로 낮은 편이었으며 150˚L미만의 품질이 낮은 제품이 절반이상이었다. 11. 보리 엿기름의 효소력가와 제품가격 간에 관련이 없었으며 오히려 품질이 낮은 제품이 비싼 경우도 있었다.

This study examines the effects of restaurant attributes on customers' perceptions of price and brand reputation. Four restaurant attributes were used to represent restaurant quality. Multiple regression was conducted to measure the relationships between the four restaurant attributes and price and brand reputation. Further, an independent T-test was used to compare differences between perceptions of locals and tourists with regard to restaurant quality under two categories (price and brand reputation) after they selected a restaurant. Results of this study revealed that residency did not have a significant impact on customers' perceptions of price or brand reputation, whereas restaurant attributes did have an impact. Taste was a predictor of perceived price, whereas service and atmosphere were predictors of brand reputation. In addition, comparison of restaurant attributes between locals and tourists showed that sanitation and service were significantly different in accordance with price and atmosphere, whereas taste and service were significantly different in accordance with brand reputation. Locals showed higher means for each restaurant attribute compared to tourists.

현행 공정거래법은 최저재판매가격유지행위의 경우 예외없이 위법한 행위로 규정하고 있다. 그런데 최근 대법원은 일련의 사건에서 공정거래법의 입법목적과 재판매가격유지행위를 금지하는 취지에 비추어 최저재판매가격유지행위가 비록 해당 상표 내의 경쟁을 제한하는 것으로 보이는 경우라 할지라도 시장의 구체적 상황에 따라 그 행위가 관련 상품시장에서의 상표간 경쟁을 촉진하여 결과적으로 소비자후생을 증대하는 등의 정당한 이유가 있는 경우에는 예외적으로 허용된다는 의견을 개진하였다. 이는 미국 연방대법원의 Leegin 사건이 국내에도 영향을 미쳐 최저재판매가격유지행위를 당연위법(per se illegality)처럼 취급하던 규제태도에 대해 재평가를 하게 되면서 기존의 최저재판매가격유지행위를 무조건 금지하던 당연위법 원칙에서 사안별로 위법성을 판단해야 한다는 합리의 원칙(rule of reason)으로 입장을 전환한 것으로 볼 수 있다. 따라서 이 논문은 재판매가격유지행위의 개념과 국내의 규제 동향을 살펴보고 美 연방대법원의 Leegin 사건을 상세하게 검토하였다. 그리고 최근 국내 최저재판매가격유지행위와 관련한 일련의 사건에 Leegin 사건의 판단개념을 적용하여 분석함으로써 향후 최저재판매가격유지행위의 판단의 결과를 도출하였다.

Using artificial neural network (ANN) technique, auction prices for common mackerel were forecasted with the daily total sale and auction price data at the Busan Cooperative Fish Market before introducing Total Allowable Catch (TAC) system, when catch data had no limit in Korea. Virtual input data produced from actual data were used to improve the accuracy of prediction and the suitable neural network was induced for the prediction. We tested 35 networks to be retained 10, and found good performance network with regression ratio of 0.904 and determination coefficient of 0.695. There were significant variations between training and verification errors in this network. Ideally, it should require more training cases to avoid over-learning, which leads to improve performance and makes the results more reliable. And the precision of prediction was improved when environmental factors including physical and biological variables were added. This network for prediction of price and catch was considered to be applicable for other fishes.

Recently, the increasing power of distributors has given them the opportunity of introducing private brand (PB) products. Based on the game theory, this study analyzes the decision making of a distributor regarding the optimal pricing and quality strategi