본 연구는 도로터널, 철도터널, 지하철, 전력구 등 각종 터널 시공을 위한 TBM(Tunnel Boring Machine) 기술의 시공성 향상을 위한 연속굴착형 TBM 장비와 나선형 세그먼트 통합 시공기술 개발 및 실증과 관련된 것으로 핵심모듈인 추진잭, 세그먼트 이렉터의 선제적인 유지관리를 통해 다운타임 을 최소화하고 굴진율을 안정적으로 확보하기 위한 연속굴착형 TBM 핵심모듈의 유지관리 및 장애대 응 기술에 대한 연구를 수행하였으며, 굴착환경과 연속굴착 운영특성을 고려한 시공 및 장비 운용 절 차를 정의하였다.

PURPOSES : This study aims to propose drone-command standard operating procedure (SOP) guidelines and Analyze their potential application to increase the use and utility of drones in urban disaster situations. Although the effectiveness and efficiency of obtaining disaster-situation information through drones have been verified by previous studies and practical experience, a survey of actual drone usability indicated a utilization rate of only approximately 4.13%. METHODS : To provide guidance for improving drone command SOPs, prior research and relevant literature were reviewed to identify commonalities between disaster-response command and control and drone use. A sample of 73 active-duty firefighters, including incident commanders (ICs) and drone pilots, were surveyed and interviewed. The data were analyzed and categorized to establish the reasons why drones are not actively used in urban disaster-response procedures. RESULTS : The primary reasons identified for not actively utilizing drones in urban disaster areas were the lack of a drone command and control system and the lack of clear criteria for when to use drones in disaster situations. In addition, many problems were found in drone-operation procedures, including emergency flight approval, securing takeoff and landing sites, and accident burden due to urban flight obstacles. To address the issues identified, standards were proposed for the type, size, and scope of urban disasters requiring drone response; for accident-prevention on basic missions and through flight safety procedures; and for installing a video transmission and reception system to easily share drone video information with ICs. CONCLUSIONS : Application of the drone-command SOP guidelines to actual urban disaster situations by disaster type will help to improve the efficiency of information acquisition and flight safety. This is expected to enable increased drone utilization. In future, extension of the research reported in this paper beyond the Seoul metropolitan area via additional follow-up studies has the potential to establish applicability of the proposed SOP guidelines to a wide variety of environments and organizational characteristics.

The 4th Industrial Revolution and the continuous development of Science and Technology have also required a speedy business promotion method in the defense industry. Advanced countries including the United States are already boldly innovating the existing high-cost and long-term acquisition system with the highest priority in weapons development to cope with the military rise of Russia and China. The Ministry of National Defense and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration have also recently introduced a quick acquisition system and are applying it to business promotion. In addition, some small-scale projects and weapons systems are being reorganized so that they can be managed by the units demanding them. After an organizational diagnosis of the Project Acquisition Group by the Ministry of National Defense in 2020, it has been reassigned as a subordinate unit of the Army Logistics Command from a direct unit managed by the Army HQ. As a result, problems such as work conflict or redundancy have been identified. In addition, a system has been implemented to shorten the acquisition period by applying a rapid acquisition program in the field of weapons systems by benchmarking the rapid acquisition program of advanced countries. The force support system project process will also need to introduce such a quick acquisition system. In addition, the Ministry of National Defense is considering ways to delegate some weapon systems to each military, which will then carry out tasks ranging from requirements determination to project management. Accordingly, it is now time to expand the organization for the management of the Army's weapons system acquisition project. Therefore, in this paper, the Army Project Acquisition Group was analyzed on its organization, acquisition procedures, and cooperation systems, with presentations of development plans for each field.

In this research, a new Test and Evaluation (T&E) procedure for defense AI systems is proposed to fill the existing gap in established methodologies. This proposed concept incorporates a data-based performance evaluation, allowing for independent assessment of AI model efficacy. It then follows with an on-site T&E using the actual AI system. The performance evaluation approach adopts the project promotion framework from the defense acquisition system, outlining 10 steps for R&D projects and 9 steps for procurement projects. This procedure was crafted after examining AI system testing standards and guidelines from both domestic and international civilian sectors. The validity of each step in the procedure was confirmed using real-world data. This study's findings aim to offer insightful guidance in defense T&E, particularly in developing robust T&E procedures for defense AI systems.

본 연구는 볼프강 아마데우스 모차르트의 초기 종교음악 중 ≪호칭기도≫ K. 109와 K. 125를 차용이라는 관점에서 고찰한다. 이 두 곡은 각각 1771년 5월, 1772년 3월에 잘츠부르크에서 작곡 되었는데, 아버지 레오폴트 모차르트의 영향을 받은 것으로 널리 알려져 있다. 하지만 구체적으로 그 영향이 어느 정도인지는 지금까지 논의되지 않았다. 본 연구에서는 모차르트의 곡들을 아버지 의 작품과 꼼꼼하게 비교하여 아버지의 영향이 가장 구체적인 경우에서부터 추상적인 경우까지 세 단계로 나누어 설명할 것이다. 모차르트가 아버지 레오폴트의 작품을 모델로 하여 어떻게 독 립적인 곡들을 만들어나갔는지 살펴보며, 이를 통해 모차르트의 ≪호칭기도≫ 뿐만 아니라 종교 음악 전반에 관한 학문적 관심을 불러일으키고자 한다.

The radioactive waste generated within radiation-controlled areas is classified and processed according to relevant laws and regulations based on contamination levels. In cases where such radioactive waste complies with the legally defined clearance concentration or dose criteria, it is disposed of as non-radioactive waste by means of incineration, reclamation, recycling, etc. Within radiation controlled areas, various consumables are periodically replaced to ensure the proper operation of the area. It is necessary to have appropriate disposal methods for these consumables. In particular, waste items such as fire extinguishers, fluorescent lamps, batteries, and pressure vessels (hereinafter referred to as “Special Waste Type”), which may contain hazardous substances within their internal components and contents, should be considered for appropriate disposal methods that comply with nuclear safety and environmental laws. In the present case, the specified special waste type do not come into direct contact with radiation sources, and they have impermeable surfaces, which significantly reduces the risk of external contamination infiltrating the interior. However, the current method of clearance is not suitable for these items (Typically, nuclear energy-related business operators are required to classify clearance target waste based on internal and external components and demonstrate compliance with the criteria. Nevertheless, for special waste type, it is difficult to separate and measure internal and external components within the radiation-controlled area). In this case, the Clearance Procedure for special waste type applied to Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute was introduced. Additionally, we have extracted considerations for future domestic clearance of the type.

Any type of nuclear arms control or disarmament agreement requires some form of verification measure. Existing nuclear arms control treaties drew upon previous agreements such as the INF treaty, START, and IAEA nuclear safeguards inspections. However, previous treaties focused on limiting specific types of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles or reducing the total number of nuclear weapons rather than eliminating the nuclear enterprise as a whole. A potential nuclear disarmament verification treaty or agreement will depend on the geopolitical environment of the time as well as the national policies and priorities of each signatory state. Although research on the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is still ongoing, several states have cooperated to conduct experiments, exercises, and simulations on the procedures and technologies required for nuclear disarmament verification. Three of these efforts are the LETTERPRESS simulation conducted by the Quadrilateral Nuclear Verification Partnership (QUAD), NuDiVe Exercise conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), and the Menzingen experiment organized by the UNIDIR in partnership with the Swiss Armed Forces, Spiez Laboratory, Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, and the Open Nuclear Network. These contain aspects for the development of a potential nuclear disarmament verification. The LETTERPRESS exercise conducted in 2017 tested potential activities and equipment inspectors might utilize in a nuclear weapon facility. The IPNDV NuDiVe exercises conducted in 2021 and 2022 tested the activities and equipment required for the verified dismantlement of a warhead within a dismantlement facility. Finally, the Menzingen experiment conducted in 2023 tested the practical procedures for the verification of a nuclear weapon’s absence at a storage site. This paper will analyze the three cases to offer considerations on the procedures and technologies future nuclear disarmament verification might include.

This study is to propose ways to improve the system for rational procedures for offshore wind power generation projects. The results of this study are summarized as follows. In order to quickly distribute and develop offshore wind power projects, the permitting period should be shortened through special laws, the government actively intervenes to support the formation and operation of privat-public councils to ensure residents' acceptance. In this way, it can be competitive in the future energy market. Above all, a special law (proposal) related to offshore wind power currently pending in the National Assembly should be passed as soon as possible. Finally, the government and local governments that manage public waters should provide active administrative support based on system improvement measures in consideration of these permits, and the project’s main body should minimize damage to the marine environment and ecosystem. Through these subject-specific roles, offshore wind power generation will be able to reduce carbon emissions and help establish a sustainable energy production system.

Radioactive waste can be classified according to the concentration level for radionuclides, and the disposal method is different through the level. Gamma analysis is inevitably performed to determine the concentration of radioactive waste, and when a large amount of radioactive waste is generated, such as decommissioning nuclear facilities, it takes a lot of time to analyze samples. The performance of a lot of analysis can cause human errors and workload. In general, gamma analysis is performed using by HPGe detector. Recently, for convenience of analysis, commercial automatic sample changers applicable to the HPGe detectors were developed. The automatic sample changers generate individual analysis reports for each sample. In this study, gamma analysis procedure was improved using the application of the automatic sample changer and the automated data parsing using by Python. The application of automatic sample changers and data parsing technique can solve the problems. The human errors were reduced to 0% compared to the previous method by improving the gamma analysis procedure, and working time were also dramatically reduced. This automation of analysis procedure will contribute to reducing the burden of analysis work and reducing human errors through various improvements.

In Korea, the construction of dry storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel is being promoted through the 2nd basic plan for high-level radioactive waste management. When operating dry storage facilities, exposure dose assessment for workers should be performed, and for this, exposure scenarios based on work procedures should be derived prior. However, the dry storage method has not yet been sufficiently established in Korea, so the work procedure has not been established. Therefore, research is needed to apply it domestically based on the analysis of spent nuclear fuel management methods in major overseas leading countries. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. Among the various spent nuclear fuel management systems, the metal overpack-based HI-STAR 100 system and the concrete overpackbased HI-STORM 100 system are quite common methods in the United States. Therefore, in this study, work procedures were analyzed based on each final safety analysis report. First, the HI-STAR 100 overpack enters the facility and is placed in the transfer area. Remove the impact limiter of the overpack and install the alignment device on the top of the overpack. Place the HI-TRAC, an on-site transfer device, on top of the alignment unit and remove the lids of the two devices to insert the canister into the HI-TRAC. When the canister transfer is complete, reseat the lid to seal it, and disconnect the HI-TRAC from the HI-STAR 100. Raise the canister-loaded HI-TRAC over the alignment device on the top of the HI-STORM 100 overpack and remove the lids of the two devices that are in contact. Insert the canister into the HI-STORM 100 and reseat the lid. The HI-STORM 100 loaded with spent nuclear fuel is transferred to the designated storage area. In this study, the procedure for receiving and storing spent nuclear fuel in a concrete overpack-based storage facility was analyzed. The main procedure was the transfer of canisters between overpacks, and it was confirmed that HI-TRAC was used in the work procedure. The results of this study can be used as basic data for evaluating the exposure dose of operating workers for the construction of dry storage facilities in Korea.

In the late 80s, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological, became an internationally important issue, and in order to keep pace with the international situation, Korea amended the Foreign Trade Act in 1992 to legislate the export control of strategic goods. In addition, Korea joined the NSG, one of the international export control regimes, in 1995, and nuclear power operators are required to obtain export licenses in accordance with the NSG export control guidelines. In the nuclear export business, technical documents, equipment, materials, SW, etc. are exported to the importer, and the export items may include strategic items designated by the NSG, so operators must check whether they are strategic items and, if so, obtain an export license in accordance with foreign trade laws that reflect the NSG export control guidelines. In the case of processing and exporting goods or materials imported from another country, exporters must fulfill complex nuclear export control procedures, including obtaining the original supplier’s consent for re-transfer. In recent years, the international situation on export control has been more sensitive than ever, including the Russo-Ukrainian war, the U.S.-China semiconductor supremacy dispute, and U.S. lawsuits against domestic companies related to original technologies. In the worst-case scenario, a company may not be able to fulfill a contract due to export control issues. In order to facilitate the smooth export business of operators when exporting nuclear energy, ‘Nuclear Export Control Pre-Consulting’ is proposed to check compliance with export control requirements in advance and provide operators with customized export control implementation plans reflecting business characteristics. Through the pre-consultation, issues, requirements, and preparatory documents related to nuclear export control can be checked before the export business starts in earnest, i.e., when the decision to participate in the business is made, and the business can be supported to export smoothly by complying with the export control system. The most important aspect of pre-consultation is that domestic nuclear exporters need to know and apply for the program. To this end, the program will be actively promoted online and offline, and support will be provided for easy application through NEPS. In addition, procedures and outcomes will be continuously refined to ensure that the program is a means of ensuring full compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation norms for nuclear exports.

An administrative agreement (AA) was signed between NSSC and UAE FANR in January 2023 under Article 5 of the ROK-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The AA aims to enhance regulatory efficiency in safeguards and export control. This study reviewed the export control measures for the items subject to the agreement (ISA) and implementation procedures under ROK-UAE AA by comparing them with other countries cases. First of all, the ROK-UAE AA distinguishes between ISA and the inventory management target items. Technology is divided into two categories, one requiring consent for retransfer and the other, considering the characteristics of technology that is free to be copied and deleted, and thus less useful for inventory management. Only the former is included in the annual report, which differs from the ROK-Canada or ROK-Japan NCA, which includes all technologies subject to the agreements in the annual report. When ROK notifies export information, it is mandatory to specify whether the technology requires consent for retransfer. Furthermore, some technologies should be controlled as strategic information, even if excluded from the annual report, so efforts to prevent confusion are required. Secondly, the ROK-UAE AA covers all items in INFCIRC/254/rev.9/part1, unlike the ROK-U.S. and ROK-Canada NCA, which listed equipment subject to them. This is significant because it clarifies the criteria for regulation by increasing the consistency between the trigger list items in the domestic law and the ISA. However, the expanded ISA scope could result in some changes in export control procedures. For example, when importing nuclear material (NM) from the US, only uranium was controlled as ISA, and the packages were not considered. In contrast, when exporting fuel assemblies (FA) for UAE, both uranium and zirconium cladding should be treated as ISA. To this end, NEPS was improved to implement the features of the ROK-UAE AA. Consideration of the criteria and methods for imposing obligations under the agreement is essential because this is the first case of Korea concluded AA under exporting NPP and as a supplier of FA. Generally, the obligations for NM are imposed by the country of origin, conversion, and enrichment countries. Canada and EU recognize the fuel fabrication process as a substantial transformation and impose customs origin where the process takes place. Hence, NM fabricated from Canadian equipment is also subject to the same obligations as NM of Canadian origin. From this perspective, it would be appropriate to ensure ROK acts as a supplier and controls when exporting domestically manufactured FA. Moreover, a proper national obligation code system will be required to specify Korea’s control rights.

In this study, the process of compressing/packaging the spent filters of Kori Unit 1, which was conceptually presented in the previous study, is advanced so that disposal suitability for each step can be secure efficiently. In particular, the differences between the previous study and this study are that the disposable filters are screened using an In-Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS), and the method of collecting representative samples for development of scaling factor is specified. The process of compressing/packaging the spent filters consists of 7 stages as follows. 1) Collecting: The spent filters temporarily stored in the filter room are collected by dose and type remotely using a robot system to minimize the radiation exposure of workers according to a pre-established packaging plan. 2) Screening: The gamma activity concentration of the spent filters received by the robot system is measured by ISOCS. The spent filters below the low-level waste concentration limit and the surface dose are transferred into the compression system, while the others are returned in the filter room again. 3) Sampling: The external perforator drilling/cutting the filter was developed for sampling required for the new scaling factors. Since the sampling is collected remotely, the risk of exposure to workers can be reduced. The newly developed scaling factor will be used to verify the disposal suitability of the packages. 4) Compression: According to the pre-established plan, the spent filter collected by dose and type, is supplied to the compression system considering the dose and radionuclide inventory. Whether to additionally store the compressed filter in the drum is determined by checking the accumulated dose. 5) Immobilization: Immobilization with a safety material is necessary when inhomogeneous wastes, like spent filters, have the total radionuclide concentration with a half-life of more than 20 years is 74,000 Bq/g or more and for filling rate or non-dispersible treatment of particulates. 6) Packaging and Analysis: Waste information is labelled onto the package after the measurements of surface dose rate and surface contamination. Finally, using the drum assay system, the gamma radionuclide concentration is measured to identify at least 95% of the total radioactivity concentration of the package. 7) Temporary Storage and Delivery: The packages are moved to temporary storage in the plant prior to disposal. After establishing the plan for delivery and applying for a takeover request to KORAD, if the acceptance inspection is passed, the packages are transported to the disposal facility.

The ROK conducts several export procedures, communications in connection with transfers; exchange of information on export plan, shipments, and receipt of nuclear materials, in accordance with bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCA) and Administrative Arrangements (AA) signed with US, Canada, and Australia. Also, the inventory amount of items subject to NCA has reported annually. This study reviewed the export procedures and management methods for spent nuclear fuel subject to NCA. The re-transfer procedures start with obtaining consent from the original exporting country. It is impossible to retransfer nuclear material without consent, whether long-term or individual case-bycase. If the material has multiple obligations, prior consent from all of those countries is required. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the foreign obligated materials correctly. In general, nuclear fuel is subject to multiple obligations of all countries through which the materials have passed during the front-end fuel cycle. Then the new obligations are imposed on those irradiated materials or their by-products after ‘used-in’ or ‘produced through the use of ’ equipment subject to NCA. For example, fuel assemblies manufactured under CANDU fuel fabrication equipment subject to ROK-Canada NCA or burned in nuclear reactors where US equipment is installed have obligations based on Canada or US agreements. In order to impose obligation to irradiated materials, the principle of proportionality is applied as stipulated in each Agreement. According to the AA between US and ROK, nuclear materials used in the equipment transferred under the Agreement and produced through them are differently controlled. After the cycle in the reactor with US-made equipment, uranium in the irradiated fuel is considered a material used in the equipment. So it would be appropriate to apply obligation proportionality according to its origin, regardless the US-made equipment. Meanwhile, the obligation under US NCA is given to the entire amount of produced plutonium in the irradiated fuel. Although the contribution to the production of fuel is to be discussed case-by-case basis in the case of Canadian obligation, applying a similar method is proper. Since the fuel is burned in the form of bundles or assemblies, it is impossible to separate the spent fuel into uranium and plutonium physically. However, as discussed above, to clarify the rights and obligations pursuant to Agreement and ensure accuracy in inventory management, the obligation codes should be imposed on irradiated fuel as not a single item but separated individual substance of materials. Moreover, when an obligation swap occurs for the irradiated fuel, its movement and combustion history should be considered to prevent confusion in confirming multiple obligations and implementing export procedure.

The Nuclear Safety Act defines items defined in nuclear cooperation agreements with each country as internationally regulated materials and requires that import and export procedures be implemented according to each agreement. In particular, the US, Canada, and Australia, which are major nuclear power suppliers, describe detailed procedures related to imports and exports in administrative agreements attached to the agreement. This paper compares and analyzes the import and export procedures of agreed items in the three major countries and proposes procedures and precautions that nuclear companies should follow for smooth import and export. The import/export procedure, according to the annexed administrative agreement, is divided mainly into Direct-transfer, Indirect-transfer, and Re-transfer. Direct transfer refers to direct import and export between countries that have signed an agreement. The four-step process of prior notice, written confirmation, shipment notice, and receipt confirmation is commonly required for direct transfer. However, in the case of Canada, if the previously related information is the same, the shipping notification and receipt confirmation procedure may be omitted. Australia only defines items included in the notification without a separate form in the administrative agreement. Indirect transfer means transferring items originating from the other two countries that signed the agreement through a third country. All three countries stipulate that item transferred by indirect transfer are also subject to the agreement, and Canada stipulates separate advance notifications and shipping notifications for indirect transfer. Australia manages indirect transfers by including information from third countries in the exchange-related information between the two countries. The US does not have a specific procedure for indirect transfer, but it is presumed that it was omitted because it was difficult to confirm the time of shipment when the US exports through a third country. Re-transfer is a procedure to obtain consent from the original exporting country in advance when exporting items held in Korea to a third country. There are two types of consent based on re-transfer, the long-term consent method, and the individual case-by-case method. Long-term consent is a method of long-term consent for re-transfer to an agreed-upon country by agreeing in advance on a list of countries where re-transfer is possible. In the long term, the procedure will be reflected in domestic laws in detail and managed through an IT-based management system so that operators can smoothly implement such complex import and export procedures.

Patient-controlled sedation systems, in which the patient has control of sedative administration, have been shown to be effective and safe for patients undergoing minor procedures. Safety depends on the adequacy of the step-wise increase in dose of the sedative, the lockout time and patient’s ability to adjust the effective activation of the handset. While there is no patient-controlled sedation (PCS) system available domestically, we have developed a new purpose-built PCS pump, and determined its degree of precision using a microweight measuring scale. The PCS system was designed to be applied to most intravenous sedatives and work through a newly developed operating software algorithm that titrates the doses and lockout times. Our system titrates the doses through software modification, and for experimental purposes, the number of steps for handset activation by the patient was set to four, and the lockout time was set to 30 s. The degree of precision of the PCS system was tested using an electronic weighing scale. The comparison of the amount infused via the PCS system with weight on the scale showed nearly same patterns at the four infusion stages, and the difference was minimal (3% on average at each infusion step). We designed and manufactured a pilot button-type PCS pump capable of use by the patient for optimal sedation, and confirmed the precise working mechanism of the pump, thereby reducing the margin of error for infusion accuracy to 3% or less on average