According to an analysis of a total of 270 judgments acknowledging the damages due to copyright infringement over the past four years from November 2017 to November 2021, the court applied Article 126 of the Copyright Act, accounting for about 85%, The lowest acknowledgment rate of about 80%. In particular, when the Plaintiff insisted on Article 125 (2) of the Copyright Act, the acknowledgment rate when the court accepted it and applied Article 125 (2) of the Copyright Act was the highest at 83%, while the acknowledgment rate when the court rejected it and applied Article 126 of the Copyright Act was the lowest. This may mean that if the Plaintiff asserts Article 125 (2) of the Copyright Act, the acknowledgment rate may vary depending on whether the court applies Article 125 (2) of the Copyright Act or Article 126. In addition, the fact that the court recently applied Article 126 of the Copyright Act to 85% of the judgments acknowledging infringement of copyright means that too many trials are calculated at the discretion of Article 126 of the Copyright Act. The fact that the court's acknowledgment rate is significantly lower than when Article 125 (1) or 125 (2) of the Copyright Act was applied means that the legislative purpose of Article 126 of the Copyright Act (to prevent a void in copyright protection by stipulating that damages for copyright infringement can be calculated at the discretion of judges if it is difficult to prove the amount of damage even under Article 125 of the Copyright Act) isn’t being realized properly, and in the end, it can mean that copyright protection through trial is not sufficient. And considering the influence of the judgment, it can mean that economic valuation of copyright in the copyright market can also be lowered. Therefore, this paper analyzed the judgement of “if it is difficult to calculate the amount of damage under Article 125” and then suggested analytical·legislative improvement methods when the court applying Article 126 of the Copyright Act. In order to ensure the predictability of whether it will be calculated under Article 125 (2) of the Copyright Act or under Article 126 of the Copyright Act, it is necessary to establish interpretation standards to ensure predictability of when Article 125(2) will be applied and Article 126 will be applied, and not only the decreasing factors but also the increasing factors needs to be considered more actively. In order to strengthen the objectivity of calculating the amount of damage under Article 126 of the Copyright Act, it is necessary to reflect in detail the factors based on the value evaluation method of copyright and the value evaluation result of the value evaluation model of the Korean Content Assessment Center. Legislatively, it is necessary to consider introducing the provisions of Article 114-4 of the Japanese Copyright Act for accurate and objective calculation of damages and the provisions of supporting professional members of the Japanese Copyright Act in order to effectively utilize Article 129-2 of the Copyright Act.

A trademark parody is a ridicule, criticism, or satire of an idea related to a registered trademark or indication of goods or services. Traditionally, parody issues have been discussed more in the context of copyright than trademark, and there have been frequent lawsuits regarding trademark parodies around the world. A few countries have recognized the social significance of trademark parodies and, therefore, have sought protection for their use via legislation or judicial precedents. However, it is debatable whether a parody of a well-known trademark —one that has become famous through years of trademark management and capital investment— results in its dilution. Moreover, some users of trademark parodies in Japan file trademark applications to the Japan Patent Office (JPO) in order to distinguish their goods and/or services from the competition. Therefore, it is equally important to discuss whether the use of trademark parody and grant of exclusive rights through trademark registration are acceptable. As there is no legal precedent for trademark parody use in Japan, the legal systems and cases related to trademark parody use in the United States, Germany, France, and Korea were examined. When the laws, regulations, and case studies of each country are organized, the following common points are observed: (1) in the case of a successful trademark parody —that is, even when associated with the original trademark, the trademark parody, which intentionally shows that it is not a good or service related to the original trademark, and adds a new form of message of satire, ridicule, joke, etc.— there is no possibility of confusion between the parody and the original, well-known trademark; (2) infringement is likely to be affirmed if the trademark parody causes dilution due to tarnishment or pollution; and (3) infringement is likely to be denied for non-commercial parodies. However, each country has different judgments regarding the acceptability of dilution due to blurring or commercial parodies. Recently, in the United States and Europe, not only copyright parodies but also trademark parodies have been allowed. The study examined the admissibility of trademark parody under Japanese law and found that the use of a successful trademark parody is allowed in the country. In other words, according to the current Japanese Trademark Law and Unfair Competition Prevention Law, in the case of a successful trademark parody, the similarity of marks and the likelihood of confusion with the original, well-known trademark is likely to be denied and does not correspond to infringement. Additionally, even when it is considered an act of unfair competition under Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law because of the dilution of a well-known trademark, it should be permitted in order to protect the freedom of expression. Furthermore, in Japan, the use of the trademark parody itself sometimes does not correspond to its use as a trademark or an indication of goods or services, which is a precondition for infringement. On the other hand, regarding the registration of trademark parody, the study organized trial decisions and judicial precedents contesting the possibility of registration of trademark parody, which has been increasing in Japan, and examined the acceptability of registration of trademark parodies in Japan. Unlike the situation of use, the study concluded that it is appropriate to refuse trademark registration, even for successful trademark parodies. The reasons are as follows: (1) the registration of the trademark parody is not permitted in other countries; (2) the need to protect the freedom of expression is not crucial, but the disadvantages for the right holder of a well-known trademark are immense; (3) it is possible for parody trademark users to secure their own use and prevent the third party’s use even without registration; and (4) the Japan Patent Office has difficulty performing a uniform examination of parody trademarks. Furthermore, as for the grounds to refuse the registration of a trademark parody, it was proposed to prevent registration by applying the existing public order or morality provisions of Article 4, Paragraph 1, Item 7 of the Japanese Trademark Law, instead of legislative measures. Parody has long been popular for adding humor and satire using another person’s work. With the recent development of the Internet and social networks, the importance and frequency of parody is increasing. To respect the cultural values of parodies and achieve the purpose of trademark laws and unfair competition prevention laws—that is, industrial development and sound economic development—continuous research is required on the most appropriate methods for the use and registration of trademark parody.

Not disclosing or inadequate disclosing of material relationship between an influencer and an advertiser(brand) when the influencer is paid or provided with any benefit by the advertiser to create contents including endorsement or testimonial could lead to a type of unfair advertising prohibited by the Act on Fair Labeling and Advertising as a deceptive advertising. The Act only contains provisons that impose penalty surcharges on business entity and business entities’ organization and accordingly amendments were proposed which include articles imposing influencers sanction such as penalty surcharges and administrative fine for inadequate disclosure of material relationship with advertisers on their endorsement or testimonial. In this context, a review on constitutional legitimacy of such sanction on an influencer based on international regulation trends is called for. As a new kind of advertisement emerges in which commercial and non-commercial speech are mixed and it is difficult to discern between the two, the ground of more lenient and relaxed judicial review standard the Constitutional Court has been applied to decision on legitimacy of restrictions to commercial advertisement is weakening. Subtle marketing using influencers’ endorsement and testimonial lacking appropriate disclosure of material link to advertisers is also an example of the novel advertising expression. Even if the more lenient approach as well as the original proportionality test is applied, there is little room for constitutional justification of sanctions against individual influencers for inadequate disclosure because the sanctions is more extensive than is necessary to achieve the goal of legislation and the additional burden imposed on individuals is greater than the public interest promoted by the introduction of sanctions. It is also difficult to justify sanctions on individual influencers in terms of the Void for Vagueness doctrine. Rather than introducing sanctions on influencers not disclosing conspicuously, alternatives like means of securing voluntary regulatory compliance(commitments decision), activating civil damages claim and development of contractual provisions influencers should comply with, and use of self-regulatory code of conduct and self-regulatory review board are the solutions which is more constitutionally justifiable and more consistent with regulatory trends for inadequate disclosure in influencers’ endorsement and testimonial.

The power of legacy media originated from material foundations, not contents. Legacy media has exercised its power through the control of means of publishing, namely rotary machines. Article 21 (3) of the Constitution reflects this. It states that “The standards of news service and broadcast facilities and matters necessary to ensure the functions of newspapers shall be determined by Act.” In the past, newspapers controlled production of information, publication of article, and distribution of newspaper. However, as big technology corporations virtually monopolized the news publishing and distribution process, the nature of legacy media has changed to be in charge of only production of information. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea concluded, “Media diversity is an indispensable premise for democratic society based on pluralism.” However, as big technology corporations and algorithms intervened in news distribution, the market for diversity of opinions market has collapsed. The monopoly of the algorithm’s distribution of articles is unconstitutional. In order to realize diversity of public opinion in a new media environment, regulation must target an algorithm not a rotary press.